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PRELHUNARY MEMORANDUM
November 26, 1980 Conference
List 3, Sheet 1
cert to CA3 (Adams; Rosenn,
concurring; Weis, dissenti-ng)

No. 80 -327.-CFX
VALLEY FORGE
CHRISTIAN COLLEGE

v.
AMERI CJ.'.N S UNTD . FOR
SEPARATN. CH. & ST., ET AL.
1.

SUMMARY:

Timely

Federal/Civil

Whether resps, who cannot demonstrate injury

to themselves as taxpayers, have standing t o challenge the
~

~I

transfer of federal property to petr, a rel i gious organization.
2.

FAC~S

AND DECISIONS BELOW:

In 1976, HEW conveyed to

petr, an allegedly sectarian college, 77 ac r es of s urplus
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federal property, as well as the·
situated thereon.

building~

and equipment

The property was transferred pursunnt to the

Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 40
U.S.C.

484(k), which authorizes HEW to sell or lease surplus

§

gvt property to tax-exempt institutions for health and
educational purposes; in accordance with the Act, the property
was deeded to the petr in return for its commitment to use the
property in a manner beneficial to the public.

Petr thus made

no financial payment for the property.
In 1977, an action was instituted in the USDC for ED Pa.
against petr and HEW by resps, a non-profit organization
dedicated to the separation of church and state, and four of
its individual directors, who are citizens and taxpayers of the
(~

u.s.

Resps claimed that the transfer of this property to petr

violated the Establishment Clause, and sought declaratory and
injunctive relief to void the transfer.

The DC (Ditter, DJ)

dismissed the suit on the ground that resps lacked standing to
sue as taxpayers under Flast v. Cohen, 392

u.s.

83 (1968),

since they challenged an exercise of Congress's property power,
U.S. Const., Art. IV,

§

spending power, Art. I,

3, cl.2, rather than its taxing and
§

8.

The DC held that resps also

lacked standing under Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop
the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1975), because they failed to allege
that they had suffered any actual or concrete injury beyond a
generalized grievance common to all taxpayers.
· CA3 reversed.
(

The CA accepted

~he

DC's conclusion that

resps lacked taxpayer standing to challenge the transfer.
Nonetheless, the ct held that resps had stancling to sue because

• -

: r; •

.
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-_____ _____________
-_

....

....._
..........__
they alleged a personal
"injury
in fact" to an interest
protected by the Establishment Clause -- their "shared

-----·--

individuated right" to a gvt that "shall make no law respecting
the establishment of religion."

Resps thus had a sufficient

"personal stake in the outcome" to assure a complete
perspective on the issues.

Flast did not require a different

result, for in that case, unlike here, the pltffs had alleged
injury only to their economic interests.
is distinguishable from Schlesinger and

u.s.

Li kewise, this cas e

u.s.

v. Richardson, 418

166 (1974), for unlike the general constitutional

limitations at issue there, the First Amendment creates legal
rights in individuals that may be vindicated in the courts.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Rosenn concluded that resps
"have standing because they possess the necessary adversity of
(:

interest, and, as a practical matter, no one is better suited
to bring this lawsuit and vindicate the freedoms embodied in
the Establishment Clause."

Judge Rosenn reasoned that because

the First Amendment is designed to protect against abuses by
.

.

political majorities, it must not depend upon the political
processes for protection.
Judge Weis dissented on the ground that "a generalized
grievance brought by concerned citizens seeking to enforce a

~------------------------~----------~
particular
constitutional guarantee has been deemed too
abstract to satisfy the injury in fact component of standing."
He noted that the

Flas~

majority had not accepted Justice

Fortas's suggestion that "[p]erhaps the vita l interest of a
citizen in the establishment issue, without reference to his
taxpayer's status, would be acceptable as a basis for this

~.-~

....-..

-

..

.

~-~-

(_

- 4 challenge."

392

u.s.

at 115-16.

In his view, then, the

majority had embraced a concept of standing that had been
presented to and rejected by this Court.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr contends that the ct below

repudiates Flast, and formulates instead a standing doctrine
that is in conflict both with this Court's recent standing
decisions and with CADC's decision ·in Amer-ican Jewish

Con~es s

v. Vance, 575 F.2d 939 (CADC 1978) (no "citizen standingn to
challenge federal program under First and Fifth Amendments).
As both the DC and the CA below realized, resps fail the first
prong of the Flast test, for they cannot demonstrate a logical
nexus between their status as taxpayers and the transfer of
this property pursuant to the Property Clause.

This Court has

consistently held that there is no taxpayer standing to

(

challenge congressional actions not based on the taxing and
spending power.

See Richardson (challenge under Art. I,

cl. 7 to CIA's secret budget): Schlesinger
Art. I,

§

(~hallenge

§

9,

under

6, cl.2 to members of Congress holding reserve

commissions).

The Court has also refused to recognize citizen

standing to assert "abstract injury" arising from nonobservance
of the Constitution.

See Schlesinger, 418

are ideological pltffs.

u.s.

at 223.

Resps

The only injury the individual resps

allege in their complaint is to their status as taxpayers: the
organizational resp asserts its special interest in maintaining
the separation of church and state.

But see Warth v. Seldin,

422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975) (organization must seek relief for
injury to itself or associational ties of members).
contrast to the pltffs in Bak e r v. Carr, 36 9

u.s.

186

Thus, in

... .

..

(
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(1962} (voting rights} and Schempp v. Abington School

u.s.

Dist~,

374

203 (1963} (classroom prayer}, resps do not assert any

concrete injury in fact.

This case cannot be distinguished

from Schlesinge= and Richardson.
Resps contend that the decision below is consistent with
this Court's opinions, as well as the opinions of other CAs.
Resps essentially adopt the reasoning of CA3.

In addition,

they contend that Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970}, makes clear that a person "may have a
spiritual stake in First Amendment values sufficient to give
standing to raise issues concerning the Establishment Clause

"

Similarly, in Allen v. Hickel, 424 F.2d 944, 946 (CADC

1970}, a challenge to the construction of a Christmas creche on

r\

federal land, CADC recognized that this Court has been
particularly ready "to find standing conferred by non-economic
values in order to consider issues concerning the Establishment
Clause

"

Resps also argue the merits of their claims that

the transfer constituted an unconstitutional transfer of
federal funds and created an impermissible entanglement.
Finally, they assert that they should have standing just as the
pltffs did in Flast, since the gvt is simply doing here
indirectly

aiding a sectarian institution

what it could

not do directly.
The SG submits that CA3 has decided a "difficult and novel"
question of standing that was left open in

~last.

Normally,

standing to sue in Establishment ciause cases exists either
(

because taxpayer funds have been spent to aid religion, see
Flast, or because the challenged actions di r ectly impinge on
the interests of the pltff, see

Sche~.

This Court has made

clear that there 1S no "citizen standing" to
generalized constitutional complaints.

itigate

Nonetheless, the

· constitutional claims raised here differ in some respects from
those in Richardson and Schlesinger, which involved claims of
violations of constitutional provisions concering the internal
processes of gvt, rather than violations of the Bill of
Rights.

However, the SG argues that there is no need to

undertake the difficult task of reexamining Establishment
Clause standing in this case.

The decision here does not

conflict with any decision of this Court or any other CA;
Vance, on which .petr relies, did not consider the question
presented here.

Moreover, the decision here is interlocutory,

and may have only limited practical consequences, since many
Establishment Clause suits already proceed on the basis of the

r'·

principles established in Flast and Schempp.

Accordingly, cert

should be denied.
4.

DISCUSSION:

I recommend a grant.

The decision below

announces a theory of "citizen standing" that is arguably in
conflict with the principles set forth in Richardson and
Schlesinger.

The SG's assertion that there is no conflict here

rests on the questionable premise that this Court's cases
indicate that there is citizen . standing to assert the violation
of some constitutional provisions, but not others.
Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 226-27.

But see

Similarly, the SG's argument

that this case may have little practical effect assumes that
its importance is restricted to the

Establi s ~ment

Clause

context; however, the reasoning of ·the court below suggests
/

that there is citizen standing to challenge violations of other

- 7
'-

-~-----------------------------------------

provisions of the Bill of Rights as well.

Finally, that the

decision below is interlocutory is not dispositive; Richardson
· carne before the Court in the same procedural posture.
There are two responses.
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From: Kr. Justice Rehnquist
Ciroulated: _..::....;F£=8~1....,.8_198=-.;1'--Recirculated: _____________

Re: No 80-327--Valley Forge Christian College et. al. v.
Amercians United for Separation of Church and State
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.
In this case, a divided Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that respondents, though lacking

t~ayer

I(
had standing

standing,

\'

in their capacity as "citizens" to challenge

governmental conduct as violative of the Establishment Clause of
the

First~Amendment.

The concurring opinion found standing,

because in its view respondents were "likely to be the best
available" plaintiffs and if "they do not have standing, it is
probable that the" conduct at issue here "would be placed beyond
judicial review."

App. to Pet. for Cert. at 34.

Because I think

the decision below implicitly overrules a long line of our cases

.. .v

beg1nn1ng w1th Frot h'1ngham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923),
decided more than a half century ago, and because I agree with

1

Ah ~ cbddJ~ . J~ ~~ ~z:~~

&,~~A~. ~t/5
I

- 2 the dissent in this case that "[i]f the basic principles of
standing prove to be unworkable or undesirable, then it is the

'
Supreme Court and not a court of appeals that has the right to
change them," App. to Pet. for Cert. at 41, I would grant the
petition for certiorari and set the case for argument .
Respondents, an organization dedicated to the principle of
separation of church and state, challenge the transfer by the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare to petitioner Valley
Forge Christian College of certain surplus federal land,
buildings and equipment .

The Government deeded the property to

the college pursuant to the Federal Property and Administrative
Servlces Act of 1949, 40 U.S.C . 471 et seq., which authorizies
governmental agencies to dispose of surplus property to private
citizens who promise to use the property in a manner beneficial
to the public.

Respondents brought suit in the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging
that the conveyance of federal property to a church-affiliated
school violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

.

. •"

~.

'

-

3 -

The District Court dismissed for lack of standing to sue,
reasoning that respondents could not show the necessary nexus
between the challenged action and their economic interest as
taxpayers to meet the narrow test of "taxpayer" standing
articulated in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), since the
college received surplus property rather than a grant of funds
under the Spending Power.
The Court of Appeals reversed.

Although the court agreed

with the District Court that respondents lacked standing to sue
as "taxpayers", it nonetheless asserted that respondents had
standing to sue based on "a personal constitutional right" to be
free of governmentally established religion.

It claimed that "an

allegation of injury in fact to an interest protected by the
Establishment Clause is all that is required for standing."
to Pet. for Cert. at 28.

App.

Judge Rosenn concurred, finding that

that respondents had the necessary adversity of interest and that
"as a practical matter, no one is better suited to bring this
lawsuit and thus vindicate the freedoms embodied in the

- 4 Establishement Clause."

Judge Weis dissented from

Id. at 31.

the court's novel formulation of standing doctrine.

He

emphasized that that a "generalized grievance brought by
concerned citizens seeking to enforce a particular constitutional
guarantee has been deemed too abstract to satisfy the injury in
fact component of standing.
to Stop the War, 418

u.s.

208

Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee
(1974);

Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) ."

United States v.

Id. at

36.

No one can be unsympathetic to the attempt of any court of
appeals judge to make sense out of our opinions dealing with
standing~ ~

--------

Nevertheless, I think it clear that the court below

has plainly embraced a concept of standing totally at odds with
the decisions of this Court.

In Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83

(1968), for example, we considered and rejected the very
reasoning adopted by the court below.

-----

The plaintiffs there

asserted that an expenditure of federal funds for sectarian
schools violated the Establishment Clause.
'----....,_...

Although Justice

Fortas suggested that "perhaps the vital interest of a citizen in

l'...

·"<l.

'

I

- 5 -

the establishment issue, without reference to his taxpayer's
status, would be accpetable as a basis for this challenge", Id.
115-116 (Fortas, J. concurring), this Court declined to adopt
that suggestion.

Instead, the Court constructed an elaborate

formula for determining when "taxpayers" had standing.

Had we

agreed with the doctrine of standing suggested by Justice Fortas,
...

----

and adopted by the court below, we would not have found it
necessary to consider the scope and extent of "taxpayer"
standing.

Indeed, the Court expressly reaffirmed the principle

articulated in Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447

(1923)

precludin~a taxpayer's use of "a federal court as a

forum in

which to air his generalized grievances about the conduct of
government or the allocation of power in the Federal System."
Id., at 106.
Since then we have consistently admonished that a citizen
who suffers equally with all other citizens will not be heard to
raise generalized grievances about the conduct of the Government . .
In Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, we held

··.

- 6 that plaintiffs as citizens lacked standing to challenge the
holding of military commissions by members of Congress.

We

explained that all citizens share equally an interest in
constitutional government and that such a "generalized interest"
was insufficient to confer standing.

We held that

standing to sue may not be predicated upon an interst of the
kind alleged here which is held in common by all members of the
public, because of the necessarily abstract nature of the injury
all citizens share. Concrete injury, whether actual or
threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which
serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally capaole . of
judicial resolution.
Id., at 220.
·
Similarly, in United States v. Richardson we found a lack of
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Central
Intelligence Agency' "secret budget".

We repeated the necessity

for plaintiffs to allege "particular concrete injury as a result
of the operation of this statute," and stressed that ideological
plaintiffs with simply a "mere 'interest in a problem'" or
"generalizied grievance" will not be permitted to assert a public
interest in a constitutional claim.
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405

u.s.

727

Id., at 177-180 (quoting
(1972).

School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 205

The case of Abington

(1963), so heavily

re.lied on by the majority and concurring opinionsL is not to the

'- .

- 7 contrary.

In that case plaintiffs demonstrated that something

more than their mere interest as a "citizen" standing was stake:
children adhering to the faith of Jehovah's Witnesses were
compelled to salute the flag at a public school, thereby being
forced either to violate their own faith or disobey School Board
resolutions.

Id., at 624, 626.

The court below accurately notes that standing barriers have
been substantially lowered in the last three decades.
does not

~ean

But that

that no barriers to "public actions" remain or that

those barriers are not sound.

It is one thing to rely, as did

the major1ty here, on Chief Justice Marshall's statement in
Marbury v. Madison, 5

u.s.

87,192 (1803)

that "[t]he very essence

of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every
'

individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he

receives an injury."

App.to Pet. for Cert. at 30.

It is quite

another matter to conjure up an ~injury" every time a plaintiff
feels that some act of some government agency at some time or
place violates some specified provision of the Constitution.

The

- 8 fact remains that, contrary to the finding of the court below,
the relief available to respondents here consists entirely of the
vindication of rights held in common by all citizens.
It would be perhaps more frank and more candid to say, as
Judge Rosenn did here, that if respondents do not have standing,
"it is probable that the transfer of property at issue here, and
other similar transfers •••• would be placed beyond judicial
~'

review."

at 34.

But the flaw with that argument of course

is that our decisions in Frothingham v. Mellon, Schlesinger v.
Reservists Committee to Stop the War, and United States v.
Richardson, clearly contemplated, and were not alarmed by, the
fact that some violations of the Constitution might go
unredressed.

Those cases recognizied that the Article III

jurisdiction conferred upon this Court and such other courts that
Congress might create was confined to "cases and controversies."
The limitation of standing to actual cases and controversies
guarantees that those who have nothing more at stake than their
interest as a "eitzen" are not allowed to roam at large through

!

• L

'

•

.

- 9 statute books, codes of regulations, and the like, in order to
litigate whether any particular statute or regulation of which
they disapprove affronts the provisions of the United States
Constitution.

In short, the conclusion of the court below--that

certain provisions of the Constitution should be enforceable upon
demand by every individual--seriously threatens the "proper
functioning both of the federal courts and of the principle of
the separation of powers."
(Harlan, J. dissenting).

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 129 n.l8
As we recognized in Schlesinger v.

- Reservists Committee to Stop the War, "the proposition that all
constituti-onal provision are enforceable by any citizen simply
because citizens are the ulitmate beneficiaries of those
provisions has no boundaries."

418

u.s.

at 227.

Because I

believe that the decision below is contrary to a long line of
cases and because I think it gives a license to the judiciary to
exercise some amporhous general supervision over the operations
of government,

United States v. Richardson, supra at 188-197

(Powell, J. concurring), I dissent from the denial of certiorari

·-- ....--- . .

~~

·~fl"""·

't"

--

--.---·-~--~.-,-.

- 10 -

and would set the case for plenary review.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

February 19, 1981

j

Re:

No. 80-327 - Valley Forge Christian College
v. Americans United

Dear Bill:
Please join me in your dissenting opinion.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc: The Conference

.:§u:prme <!J!!ur± of ~e ~w ~tateg
~lyi:ngilln. ~·

<!J.

zogrJt~

CHAMBERS OF

February 19, 1981

JUSTICE BYRON R . wHITE

Re:

80-327 - Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State

Dear Bill,
Please join me in your dissent .

Sincer~~

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

..

~
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tqt 1lfuiteb .§taftil
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CHAMBERS OF'

February 19 1 1981

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

REP

80-327- Valley Forge Christian College v. _'
Americans United for Separation of
Church and State

Dear Bill:
Add me to your "dissent" which appears to make
this a "grant."
Regards,

Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

'I.

'·

"''

February 19, 1981

No. 80-327

Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
united

Dear Bill:
Although I would much prefer to grant and reverse
this case summarily, unless this can be done, please add my
name to your dissenting opinion.
Sincerely,
_,

Mr: Justice Rehnquist
LFP/lab
Copies to the Conference

.. _

,. ,..
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To: Mr. Justice Powell
October 13, 1981
From: John Wiley
No. 80-327: Valley Forge Christian
College, et al. v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc., et al.

~~~A,Wif)f W<.. ~
~ ./-......._ 41« &-c..L""'
.7 ;R ,.,~th• ......-<-.
lr,___ Question Presented
~~

<A,,

--7~':C,

Whether the Americans United for Separation of Church
and

State

(AUSCS)

has

standing

to

assert

an

Establishment

Clause violation arising from the federal government's transfer
of surplus real estate to a sectarian college.
I.
Article

IV,

Background

Section 3,

Clause 2 of the Constitution

provides
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Terri tory and other Property
belonging to the United States • . . •

~~
'5~~.--~.~ LU,~
~/it~,.~/~ . .

,•

.

~(,I

•

2.

The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949,
40 U.S.C. §471 et seq., sets forth a procedure for disposing of
surplus

federal

property.

agencied

indicate

a

need

If
for

neither

Congress

the property,

nor

other

the Secretary of

Education, by regulation, is to publicize and sell the property
so

as

to

produce

educational

the

greatest

institutions

are

public

entitled

to

reduction

a

~~~

Nonprofit

benefit.

in ~-

purchase price known as the "public benefit allowance."
In
procedures
built

to

services.

this
for

case,

u.s.

the

government

the Valley Forge General Hospital,

provide

medical

care

for

It conveyed 77 acres of

members

land,

these

followed

of

a

facility
armed

the

worth about half a

million dollars, to the Valley Forge Christian College (VFCC},
an educational institution operated by a religious order known
as the Assembly of God that "places considerable emphasis on
religious

instruction

that

• prepares some of

•

and

values

in some of

its classes and

its students for

the ministry."

S.G. brief at 9 n.6.

The government conveyed the land to VFCC

in

paid

II

fee

simple.

<Jtpoublic benefit

VFCC

allowanc~

was set at

subsequent required the college to
specified

educational

.,

nothing

purposes

for

property

100~ Certain

~~he
for

the

30

as

conditions

~"1 -

land exclusively for
years.

VFCC

relocated its campus onto the 77 acre tract and converted
hospital to a college.

the

then

~
~

th~

AUSCS learned of the transfer through a

new> release and sued to challenge the conveyance in 1976.

It

f\

complaint named as plaintiffs itself and four individuals that

.. ,

•'

3.

it

employed

in

executive

positions.

complaint for want of standing.
A divided

panel

of

The

dismissed

the

,.....,.
the

CA3

reversed.

#L

-

DC

''

Judge

Adams

He found, however, CI!J z..

agreed that resp lacked taxpayer standing.

that resp's interest in the separation of church and state was

conveyance

in

question.

separate statement.

Judge

Rosenn

1)

~

fact~

sufficiently particular and concrete to be injured in
the

( 2.-

concurred

in

a

Judge Weis dissented.

II. Discussion
This is an easy case for you.

Precedents control it,

u.s.

and your concurrence in United States v. Richardson, 418
166,

180

further

(1974)
the

makes

law

of

clear

you

standing.

are

You

not

inclined

therefore

to

should

expand
vote

to

reverse.
The CA3 unanimously agreed that resps did not possess ")4..0
~J"-[4/
taxpayer standing under Flast v. Cohen, 392 u.s. 83 ( 19 6 8) • 41-. <I.

,

This

is a

significant holding,

as your Richarson concurrence

..,

stated your willingness--for reasons of stare decisis--to allow
Flast to stand "on its facts
forth your
expansion
absence

belief,
of

of

however,

federal
specific

•

II

Id. at 180.

You set

that the Court "should limit the

taxpayer
statutory

and

citizen

standing

authorization

to

in

an

boundary drawn by the results in Flast and Baker v. Carr."
at

196

(emphasis

in

original).

By

attacking

an

the

outer
Id.

executive

action rather than a specific statute enacted under the Taxing

,, .

•

•·
',,

-·

4.

and Spending Clause, this case steps beyond Flast's result.
consequently

errs

under

the

rationale

of

your

It

Richarson

concurrence.
The
standing

CA3

that

in

fact

transgress

based

its

holding

established

case

on

notions
I

law.

will

of
not

spend much of your time developing this point, as it has been
argued forcefully--and I think correctly--both in Judge Weis's

--

dissent and by Justice Rehnquist in his proposed dissent from
denial of
proposed
short,

Justice

cert

in

dissent
the

that

CA3

Fortas

(As you

this Court.
prompted

decision
but

the grant

adopts

rejected

recall,

the

by

majority

I I

this

in this case.)

rationale

the

it was

in

In

proposed

by

Flast.

It

•'

permits a group to air a generalized grievance without alleging
"some particularlized injury that sets him apart from the man
on the street."
someone

must

infringement.

Id. at 194.
be

available

But

this

It is justified by the logic that
to

redress

proposition

repeatedly rejected by the Court.

every

has

been

constitutional
explicitly

(1974).

u.s. at
u.s. 208,

See Richardson, 418

179: Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the war, 418
227

and

Finally, I think the SG effectively rebuts resps'

tardy claim of A.P.A. standing.
The

reasoning

See SG Reply Brief at 17-18.

necessary

to

settle

this

case

is

sufficiently plain from prior cases to permit brief per curiam
treatment

(assuming,

of

course,

that

a

majority

agrees

with

this view of the case).

..•

..

~·

"
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

December 3, 1981

Re:

No. 80-327 - Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United For Separation
of Church and State, Inc.

Dear Bill:
I await the dissent.
Sincerely,

'····· ~

T.M.

Justice Rehnquist
cc:

The Conference

..

........,
:§u.puuu ~aurt of tftr ~tti:ttb :§hrltl'f

'Jlttsftington, :!Q. ~·
CH AM BE R S

20,?J.I..;1

OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . R E HNQUIST

December 3 , 198 1

~-

Re:

No . 80-32 7 Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United , et al .

Dear Sandra :
In accordance with our conversation , I am circulating
to the three others who voted to reverse Valley Forge , which
I was a ssigned and of which a proposed opinion for the
Court is pres e ntly in circulation , as to whether we should
e xpressly overrule Flast v. Cohen .
I wrote the opinion so
as to confine Flast in accordance with my sense of the
Conference view that there were not five solid votes t o
overrule it , but if the Chief , Lewis , and Byron are willing
to overrule it , I am certainly willing to rewrite the
opinion so as to accomplish that result .
Sincerely ,

Justice O'Connor
cc :

The Chief Justice
Justice White
Justice Powell

•,..

,,,
·l.

' .,..'

··'

.

_,_._
I

;§Itprtmt ~ourl of t~t ~1niftb ~air:;

~'t-r~slyi:ngton, J}3. ~· :W;J.l!-2

~: ' i.'

CHAMB E RS OF

I~C:IVt:L)

;i .::!:S CF THE
.: .. i~F JUSTICE

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

-----

December 3, 1981
Re:

No. 80-327 Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United, et al.

Dear Sandra:
In accordance with our conversation, I am circulating
to the three others who voted to reverse Valley Forge, which
I was assigned and of which a proposed opinion for the
Court is presently in circulation, as to whether we should
expressly overrule Flast v. Cohen.
I wrote the opinion so
as to confine Flast in accordance with my sense of the
Conference view that there were not five solid votes to
overrule it, but if the Chief, Lewis, and Byron are willing
to overrule it, I am certainly willing to rewrite the
opinion so as to accomplish that result.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
cc:

l

'·

The Chief Justice
Justice White
Justice Powell

~uvrtmt <!Jcurf

ttf fqt ,ni.ttb ~taft%'

~curlyhtgf!ln,~.

<q.

2ll.?~~

CHAMBERS Of'

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

December 3, 1981

No. 80-327

Valley Forge Christian College
v. Americans United for Separation
of Church and State, Inc.

Dear Bill,
Please join me in your opinion in the referenced
case.
If you find s~ fficient support among the other
Justices, I am still vwilling to go further and overrule
Flast v. Cohen. "
Sincerely,

Justice Rehnquist

Copies to the Conference

,•

December 3, 1981
.~
·~ 1

80-327 Valley Forge v. Americans Uni.ted

Dear Bill:

.
~

.

I have noted with interest Sandra's suggestion
that she is "willinq to go further and overrule Flast v.
Cohen."

I continue to think for the reasons stated in my
concurrinq opinion in Richardson that Flast waa an unsound
opinion. Overruling it therefore has a gooa deal of appeal.
Yet, I have some hesitation as to the desirability of doing
this by a bare majority vote. Flast - a 1968 decision - was
decided with only one dissenting vote.

Moreover, your current draft in this case leaves
Flast a "bare bones" precedent with little or no force
beyond its specific facts. In sum, although I would be
happy to join five others, I think there are institutional
reasons for not overruling it lf four Justices are in
dissent.
·
I

am happy to join Bill's opinion as written.
Sincerely,

Justice Rehnquist
lfp/ss
cc:

The Chief Justice
Justice White
Justice O'Connor

j\u:prrnu <!faurlaf tfrt ~~ j\ftth_g
~zwlpnghtn.l9. (!}. zo~J!~
CHAMBERS OF

'

/

December 3, 1981

JUSTICE Wt<. J . BRENNAN, JR.

"'
I

. . . ..

j
f

I..

RE:

No. 80-327

Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation
of Church and State, Inc. ,et al.

I

Dear Bill:
I shall shortly be circulating a dissent in the
above .

;·.·,..

.'i
·-..~

Sincerely,
'1
(

lI
I

1

'

I

rA_\_A__
1·

/-

Justice Rehnquist
cc: The Conference

{J

.:§upr.cutt <!j:tturl ttf fl!t ~dt ~faf.tg

'J]liasfringLm. ~. <!J:. 20~JI.~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

December 3, 1981
Re:

No. 80-327

Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United, et al.

Dear Sandra:
You, the Chief and I are all willing to overrule Flast;
Lewis has said that he thought he could agree to it but Byron
is unwilling to do it.
I would prefer a five member court
opinion in its present analysis rather than a plurality
opinion with one concurrence in the result , and unless
otherwise pressured by resistance will leave the opinion
in substantially its present shape .
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
cc: The Chief Justice
Justice Powell
Justice White

.•

~""

jsw

12/16/81

Memorandum to Justice Powell
Re:

WJB's dissent in Valley Forge Christian College

Justice

Brennan

has

circulated

a

lengthy

points, heated dissent in this standing case.

and,

at

The key to his

position is expressed in Part IIB (pages 13-19).

This section

argues that the Constitution creates a special taxpayer right
to

be

free

from

taxation

that measurably

supports

religion.

The most powerful portion of this dissent is at pages 16-17,
where Justice Brennan recounts the colonial efforts of Madison
and

Jefferson

Freedom

law--the

position.
support

in

securing
text

of which does

See page 16

any

passage of

the Virginia

Religious

support Just ice Brennan

("no man shall be compelled to

religious

• ministry whatsoever")

•

(emphasis

added).
Justice Brennan's dissent essentially seeks to revise
the rationale of Flast to separate Flast's Establishment Clause
standing

holding--which

supports--from
nexus test.
test

offered

its much-criticized

Brennan
and

more

enthusiastically
general

two-part

See WJB dissent at 21-22 ("The two-pronged 'nexus'
by

the Court,

best understood as
leg ing only

Justice

despite

its general

language,

is

'determinant of standing of plaintiffs al-

injury as

taxpayers who challenge alleged viola-

•

..

0

.

'.

2.
tions

of

the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of

First Amendment,'
principles."}
narrowing

the

and not as a general statement of standing

(footnote deleted and emphasis added}.

revision

is

incomplete

in two respects.

Yet this
First,

as

the emphasized portion of this quote illustrates, Justice Brennan believes Flast must also convey federal taxpayer standing
in Free Exercise Clause cases--even though these would expand
on Flast' s

holding.

This belief is consistent with the his-

torical basis for his position.
suggests

that

continuing

Second, Justice Brennan also

the general two part nexus

vitality.

See dissent at

test may have some

22 n.l7

("In the years

since the announcement of the Flast test we have yet to recognize a

similar

know of none.

restriction on Congress'

power

to tax,

and I

Nevetheless, like the Justices who joined in the

Court opinion in Flast, I remain reluctant to rule out the possibility."}.
You have previously written that you "would not overrule Flast on its facts, because it is now settled that federal
taxpayer standing exists in Establishment Clause cases."
ed States v. Richardson, 418

u.s.

166, 180 (1974}.

Unit-

Even though

I find Justice Brennan's thinking in the context of the Establishment Clause to be persuasive, the implications of his position clash with your

---

previously expressed views.

Unless you

are willing to expand your statement in Richardson to include
Free Exercise cases, ?Justice Brennan's dissent is apt not to
appeal to you.

I there ore recommend that you continue to join

Justice Rehnquist.
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JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

December 3, 1981

Re: 80-327 - Valley Forge Christian College
v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc.

Dear Bill ,
Please join me.

I would not overrule Flast.

Sincerely yours,

Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference
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3rd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES
No. 80-327

VALLEY FORGE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE, PETITIONER v. AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION
OF CHURCH AND STATE, INC., ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[December - , 1981]

JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
I

Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution vests
Congress with the "Power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the ... Property belonging to the United States." Shortly after the termination of
hostilities in the Second World War, Congress enacted the
Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949,
63 Stat. 377, 40 U. S. C. §471 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp.
III). The Act was designed, in part, to provide "an economical and efficient system for . . . the disposal of surplus property." 63 Stat. 378, 40 U. S. C. §471. In furtherance of
this policy, federal agencies are directed to maintain adequate inventories of the property under their control and to
identify excess property for transfer to other agencies able to
use it. See 63 Stat. 384, 40 U.S. C. §483(b), (c).' Property that has outlived its usefulness to the federal government is declared "surplus" 2 and may be transferred to pri1
The Act defines "excess property" as "property under the control of
any Federal agency which is not required for its needs and the discharge of
its responsibilities." 63 Stat. 378, 40 U. S. C. § 472(e).
2
The Act defines "surplus property" as "any excess property not re-
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vate or other public entities. See generally 63 Stat. 385, as
amended, 40 U. S. C. § 484.
The Act authorizes the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare (now the Secretary of Education 3) to assume
responsibility for disposing of surplus real property "for
school, classroom, or other educational use." 63 Stat. 387,
as amended, 40 U. S. C. §484(k)(1). Subject to the disapproval of the Administrator of General Services, the Secretary may sell or lease the property to nonprofit, tax exempt
educational institutions for consideration that takes into account "any benefit which has accrued or may accrue to the
United States" from the transferee's use of the property. 63
Stat. 387, 40 U. S. C. § 484(k)(1)(A), (C). 4 By regulation,
the Secretary has provided for the computation of a "public
benefit allowance," which discounts the transfer price of the
property "on the basis of benefits to the United States from
the use of such property for educational purposes." 34 CFR
§ 12. 9(a) (1980). 5
The property which spawned this litigation was acquired
by the Department of the Army in 1942, as part of a larger
tract of approximately 181 acres of land northwest of Philadelphia. The Army built on that land the Valley Forge Genquired for the needs and the discharge of the responsibilities of all Federal
agencies, as determined by the Administrator [of General Services]." 63
Stat. 379, 40 U. S. C. § 472(g).
3
See 20 U.S. C. §§3411, 3441(a)(2)(P) (1976 ed., Supp. III).
'The property is to "be awarded to the applicant having a program of
utilization which provides, in the opinion of the Department [of Education],
the greatest public benefit." 34 CFR § 12.5 (1980). Applicants must be
willing and able to assume immediate responsibility for the property and
must demonstrate the financial capacity to implement the approved program of educational use. !d. § 12.8(b).
• In calculating the public benefit allowance, the Secretary considers
factors such as the applicant's educational accreditation, sponsorship of
public service training, plans to introduce new instructional programs,
commitment to student health and welfare, research, and service to the
handicapped. 34 CFR pt. 12, Exh. A (1980).
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eral Hospital, and for 30 years thereafter, that hospital provided medical care for members of the Armed Forces. In
April 1973, as part of a plan to reduce the number of military
installations in the United States, the Secretary of Defense
proposed to close the hospital, and the General Services Administration declared it to be "surplus property."
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) eventually assumed responsibility for disposing of
portions of the property, and in August 1976, it conveyed a
77-acre tract to petitioner, the Valley Forge Christian College. 6 The appraised value of the property at the time of
conveyance was $577,500. 7 This appraised value was discounted, however, by the Secretary's computation of a 100%
public benefit allowance, which permitted petitioner to acquire the property without making any financial payment for
it. The deed from HEW conveyed the land in fee simple
with certain conditions subsequent, which required petitioner to use the property for 30 years solely for the educational purposes described in petitioner's application. In that
description, petitioner stated its intention to conduct "a program of education . . . meeting the accrediting standards of
the State of Pennsylvania, The American Association of Bible
Colleges, the Division of Education of the General Council of
the Assemblies of God and the Veterans Administration."
Petitioner is a nonprofit educational institution operating
under the supervision of a religious order known as the Assemblies of God. By its own description, petitioner's purpose is "to offer systematic training on the collegiate level to
men and women for Christian service as either ministers or
6
The remaining property was conveyed to local school districts for educational purposes or set aside for park and recreational use. At the time
of the conveyance, petitioner was known as the Northeast Bible College.
7
The appraiser placed no value on the buildings and fixtures situated on
the tract. The buildings had been constructed for use as an army hospital
and, in his view, the expense necessary to render them useful for other
purposes would have offset the value of such an endeavor.
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laymen." App. 34. Its degree programs reflect this orientation by providing courses of study "to train leaders for
church related ministries." Id., at 102. Faculty members
must "have been baptized in the Holy Spirit and be living
consistent Christian lives," id., at 37, and all members of the
college administration must be affiliated with the Assemblies
of God, id., at 36. In its application for the 77-acre tract, petitioner represented that, if it obtained the property, it would
make "additions to its offerings in the arts and humanities,"
and would strengthen its "psychology" and "counselling"
courses to provide services in inner city areas.
In September 1976, respondents Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc. (Americans United),
and four of its employees, learned of the conveyance through
a news release. Two months later, they brought suit in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania to challenge the conveyance on the ground that
it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 8 See App. 10. In its amended complaint, Americans
United described itself as a nonprofit organization composed
of 90,000 "taxpayer members." The complaint asserted that
each member "would be deprived of the fair and constitutional use of his (her) tax dollar for constitutional purposes in
violation of his (her) rights under the First Amendment of
Respondents
the United States Constitution." Ibid.
sought a declaration that the conveyance was null and void,
and an order compelling petitioner to transfer the property
back to the United States. Id., at 11.
On petitioner's motion, the District Court granted summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. App. to Pet.
for Cert. A42. The court found that respondents lacked
standing to sue as taxpayers under Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S.
8

"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.

"
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83 (1968), and had "failed to allege that they have suffered
any actual or concrete injury beyond a generalized grievance
common to all taxpayers." App. to Pet. for Cert. A43.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, which reversed the judgment of the District
Court by a divided vote. 619 F. 2d 252 (1980). All members of the court agreed that respondents lacked standing as
taxpayers to challenge the conveyance under Flast v. Cohen,
supra, since that case extended standing to taxpayers qua
taxpayers only to challenge congressional exercises of the
power to tax and spend conferred by Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution, and this conveyance was authorized by legislation
enacted under the authority of the Property Clause, Art. IV,
§ 3, cl. 2. Notwithstanding this significant factual difference
from Flast, the majority of the Court of Appeals found that
respondents also had standing merely as "citizens," claiming
"'injury in fact' to their shared individuated right to a government that 'shall make no law respecting the establishment
of religion."' 619 F. 2d, at 261. In the majority's view, this
"citizen standing'' was sufficient to satisfy the "case or controversy" requirement of Art. III. One judge, perhaps
sensing the doctrinal difficulties with the majority's extension of standing, wrote separately, expressing his view that
standing was necessary to satisfy "the need for an available
plaintiff," without whom "the Establishment Clause would be
rendered virtually unenforceable" by the Judiciary. I d., at
267, 268. The dissenting judge expressed the view that respondents' allegations constituted a "generalized grievance
... too abstract to satisfy the injury in fact component of
standing." I d., at 269. He therefore concluded that their
standing to contest the transfer was barred by this Court's
decisions in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the
War, 418 U. S. 208 (1974), and United States v. Richardson,
418 U. S. 166 (1974). 619 F. 2d, at 270-271.
Because of the unusually broad and novel view of standing
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to litigate a substantive question in the federal courts
adopted by the Court of Appeals, we granted certiorari, 450
U. S. 909 (1981), and we now reverse.
II
Article III of the Constitution limits the "judicial power" of
the United States to the resolution of "cases" and "controversies." The constitutional power of federal courts cannot be
defined, and indeed has no substance, without reference to
the necessity "to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual
controversies." Liverpool Steamship Co. v. Commissioners
of Emigration, 113 U. S. 33, 39 (1885). The requirements of
Art. III are not satisfied merely because a party requests a
court of the United States to declare its legal rights, and has
couched that request for forms of relief historically associated
with courts of law in terms that have a familiar ring to those
trained in the legal process. The judicial power of the
United States defined by Art. III is not an unconditioned authority to determine the constitutionality of legislative or executive acts. The power to declare the rights of individuals
and to measure the authority of governments, this Court said
90 years ago, "is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a
necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy." Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143
U. S. 339, 345 (1892). Otherwise, the power "is not judicial
. . . in the sense in which judicial power is granted by the
Constitution to the courts of the United States." United
States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40, 48 (1852).
As an incident to the elaboration of this bedrock requirement, this Court has always required that a litigant have
"standing" to challenge the action sought to be adjudicated in
the lawsuit. The term "standing" subsumes a blend of constitutional requirements and prudential considerations, see
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975), and it has notalways been clear in the opinions of this Court whether particular features of the "standing'' requirement have been re-
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quired by Art. III ex proprio vigore, or whether they are
requirements that the Court itself has erected and which
were not compelled by the language of the Constitution.
See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S., at 97.
A recent line of decisions, however, has resolved that
ambiguity, at least to the following extent: at an irreducible
minimum, Art. III requires the party who invokes the court's
authority to "show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal
conduct of the defendant," Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of
Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 99 (1979), and that the injury "fairly
can be traced to the challenged action" and "is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision," Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 38, 41 (1976). 9 In this
manner does Art. III limit the federal judicial power "to
those disputes which confine federal courts to a role consistent with a system of separated powers and which are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process." Flast v. Cohen, supra, at 97.
The requirement of "actual injury redressable by the
court," Simon, supra, at 39, serves several of the "implicit
policies embodied in Article III," Flast, supra, at 96. It
tends to assure that the legal questions presented to the
court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to
a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.
The "standing" requirement serves other purposes. Because it assures an actual factual setting in which the litigant
See Watt v. Energy Action Educational Foundation, U. S. - ,
(1981); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
438 U. S. 59, 72 (1978); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261, 262 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 499
(1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U. S.
208, 218, 22{}-221 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166,
179-180 (1974); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 493 (1974); Linda R.S.
v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 617-618 (1973).
9
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asserts a claim of injury in fact, a court may decide the case
with some confidence that its decision will not pave the way
for lawsuits which have some, but not all, of the facts of the
case actually decided by the court.
The Art. III aspect of standing also reflects a due regard
for the autonomy of those persons likely to be most directly
affected by a judicial order. The federal courts have abjured
appeals to their authority which would convert the judicial
process into "no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the
value interests of concerned bystanders." United States v.
SCRAP, 412 U. S. 669, 687 (1973). Were the federal courts
merely publicly funded forums for the ventilation of public
grievances or the refinement of jurisprudential understanding, the concept of "standing'' would be quite unnecessary.
But the "cases and controversies" language of Art. III forecloses the conversion of courts of the United States into judicial versions of college debating forums. As we said in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 740 (1972):
"The requirement that a party seeking review must allege facts showing that he is himself adversely affected
. . . does serve as at least a rough attempt to put the decision as to whether review will be sought in the hands of
those who have a direct stake in the outcome."
The exercise of judicial power, which can so profoundly affect
the lives, liberty, and property of those to whom it extends,
is therefore restricted to litigants who can show "injury in
fact" resulting from the action which they seek to have the
Court adjudicate.
The exercise of the judicial power also affects relationships
between the coequal arms of the national government. The
effect is, of course, most vivid when a federal court declares
unconstitutional an act of the Legislative or Executive
branch. While the exercise of that "ultimate and supreme
function," Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143
U. S., at 345, is a formidable means of vindicating individual
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rights, when employed unwisely or unnecessarily it is also
the ultimate threat to the continued effectiveness of the federal courts in performing that role. While the propriety of
such action by a federal court has been recognized since
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), it has been recognized as a tool of last resort on the part of the federal judiciary throughout its nearly 200 years of existence:
"[R]epeated and essentially head-on confrontations between the life-tenured branch and the representative
branches of government will not, in the long run, be beneficial to either. The public confidence essential to the
former and the vitality critical to the latter may well
erode if we do not exercise self-restraint in the utilization of our power to negative the actions of the other
branches." United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S., at
188 (POWELL, J., concurring).
Proper regard for the complex nature of our constitutional
structure requires neither that the judicial branch shrink
from a confrontation with the other two coequal branches of
the federal government, nor that it hospitably accept for adjudication claims of constitutional violation by other branches
of government where the claimant has not suffered cognizable injury. Thus this Court has "refrain[ed] from passing
upon the constitutionality of an act [of the representative
branches] unless obliged to do so in the proper performance
of our judicial function, when the question is raised by a party
whose interests entitle him to raise it." Blair v. United
States, 250 U. S. 273, 279 (1919). The importance of this
precondition should not be underestimated as a means of "defin[ing] the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power." Flast v. Cohen, supra, at 95.
Beyond the constitutional requirements, the federal judiciary has also adhered to a set of prudential principles that
bear on the question of standing. Thus, this Court has held
that "the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights
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and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal
rights or interests of third parties." Warth v. Seldin, 422
U. S., at 499. 10 In addition, even when the plaintiff has alleged redressable injury sufficient to meet the requirements
of Art. III, the Court has refrained from adjudicating "abstract questions of wide public significance" which amount to
"generalized grievances," pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed in the representative branches. I d.,
at 499-500. 11 Finally, the Court has required that the plaintiff's complaint fall within "the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee
in question." Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U. S.
150, 153 (1969). 12

Merely to articulate these principles is to demonstrate
their close relationship to the policies reflected in the Art. III
requirement of actual or threatened injury amenable to judicial remedy. But neither the counsels of prudence nor the
policies implicit in the "case or controversy" requirement
should be mistaken for the rigorous Art. III requirements
themselves. Satisfaction of the former cannot substitute for
a demonstration of "'distinct and palpable injury' ... that is
likely to be redressed if the requested relief is granted."
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, supra, at 100
(quoting Warth v. Seldin, supra, at 501). That requirement
states a limitation on judicial power, not merely a factor to be
balanced in the weighing of so-called "prudential"
considerations.
We need not mince words when we say that the concept of
"Art. III standing" has not been defined with complete con10
See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S., at 100;
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438
U. S., at 80; Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 113--114 (1976).
11
See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, supra, at 100; Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., supra, at 80.
12
See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, supra, at 100, n. 6;
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S., at 39, n. 19.
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sistency in all of the various cases decided by this Court
which have discussed it, nor when we say that this very fact
is probably proof that the concept cannot be reduced to a onesentence or one-paragraph definition. But of one thing we
may be sure: Those who do not possess Art. III standing may
not litigate as suitors in the courts of the United States. 13
Art. III, which is every bit as important in its circumscription of the judicial power of the United States as in its granting of that power, is not merely a troublesome hurdle to be
overcome if possible so as to reach the "merits" of a lawsuit
which a party desires to have adjudicated; it is a part of the
basic charter promulgated by the framers of the Constitution
at Philadelphia in 1787, a charter which created a general
government, provided for the interaction between that government and the governments of the several States, and was
later amended so as to either enhance or limit its authority
with respect to both States and individuals.
III
The injury alleged by respondents in their amended complaint is the "depriv[ation] of the fair and constitutional use of
13
The dissent takes us to task for "tend[ing] merely to obfuscate, rather
than inform, our understanding of the meaning of rights under the law."
Post, at--. Were this Court constituted to operate a national classroom
on "the meaning of rights" for the benefit of interested litigants, this criticism would carry weight. The teaching of Art. III, however, is that constitutional adjudication is available only on terms prescribed by the Constitution, among which is the requirement of a plaintiff with standing to
sue. The dissent asserts that this requirement "overrides no other provision of the Constitution," id., at--, but just as surely the Art. III power
of the federal courts does not wax and wane in harmony with a litigant's
desire for a "hospitable forum," id., at--. Art. III obligates a federal
court to act only when it is assured of the power to do so, that is, when it is
called upon to resolve an actual case or controversy. Then, and only then,
may it turn its attention to other constitutional provisions and presume to
provide a forum for the adjudication of rights. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 345 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

·.
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[their] tax dollar." J.A. 10. 14 As a result, our discussion
must begin with Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447
(1923). In that action a taxpayer brought suit challenging
the constitutionality of the Maternity Act of 1921, which provided federal funding to the States for the purpose of improving maternal and infant health. The injury she alleged consisted of the burden of taxation in support of an
unconstitutional regime, which she characterized as a deprivation of property without due process. "Looking through
forms of words to the substance of [the] complaint," the
Court concluded that the only "injury" was the fact "that officials of the executive branch of the government are executing
and will execute an act of Congress asserted to be unconstitutional." I d., at 488. Any tangible effect of the challenged
statute on the plaintiff's tax burden was "remote, fluctuating,
and uncertain." Id., at 487. In rejecting this as a cognizable injury sufficient to establish standing, the Court
admonished:
"The party who invokes the power [of judicial review]
must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid
but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite
way in common with people generally. . . . Here the
parties plaintiff have no such case." I d., at 488.
Following the decision in Frothingham, the Court confirmed that the expenditure of public funds in an allegedly
"Respondent Americans United has alleged no injury to itself as an
organization, distinct from injury to its taxpayer members. As a result,
its claim to standing can be no different from those of the members it seeks
to represent. The question is whether "its members, or any one of them,
are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged
action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members
themselves brought suit." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S., at 511. See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 40; Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 739-741 (1972).
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unconstitutional manner is not an injury sufficient to confer
standing, even though the plaintiff contributes to the public
coffers as a taxpayer. In Doremus v. Board of Education,
342 U. S. 429 (1952), plaintiffs brought suit as citizens and
taxpayers, claiming that a New Jersey law which authorized
public school teachers in the classroom to read passages from
the Bible violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. The Court dismissed the appeal for lack of
standing:
"This Court has held that the interests of a taxpayer in
the moneys of the federal treasury are too indeterminable, remote, uncertain and indirect to furnish a basis for
an appeal to the preventive powers of the Court over
their manner of expenditure. . . . Without disparaging
the availability of the remedy by taxpayer's action to restrain unconstitutional acts which result in direct pecuniary injury, we reiterate what the Court said of a federal
statute as equally true when a state Act is assailed: 'The
party who invokes the power must be able to show not
only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained
or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that
he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people
generally."' !d., at 433-434 (quoting Frothingham v.
Mellon, supra, at 488) (citations omitted).
In short, the Court found that plaintiffs' grievance was "not a
direct dollars-and-cents injury but is a religious difference."
I d., at 434. A case or controversy did not exist, even though
the "clash of interests [was] real and ... strong." !d., at
436 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The Court again visited the problem of taxpayer standing
in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 (1968). The taxpayer plaintiffs in Flast sought to enjoin the expenditure of federal funds
under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965,
which they alleged were being used to support religious
schools in violation of the Establishment Clause. The Court
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developed a two-part test to determine whether the plaintiffs
had standing to sue. First, because a taxpayer alleges injury only by virtue of his liability for taxes, the Court held
that "a taxpayer will be a proper party to allege the unconstitutionality only of exercises of congressional power under
the taxing and spending clause of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution." !d., at 102. Second, the Court required the taxpayer
to "show that the challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations upon the exercise of the taxing and
spending power and not simply that the enactment is generally beyond the powers delegated to Congress by Art. I, § 8."
Id., at 102--103.
The plaintiffs in Flast satisfied this test because "[t]heir
constitutional challenge [was] made to an exercise by Congress of its power under Art. I, § 8, to spend for the general
welfare," id., at 103, and because the Establishment Clause,
on which plaintiffs' complaint rested, "operates as a specific
constitutional limitation upon the exercise by Congress of the
taxing and spending power conferred by Art. I, §8," id., at
104. The Court distinguished Frothingham v. Mellon,
supra, on the ground that Mrs. Frothingham had relied, not
on a specific limitation on the power to tax and spend, but on
a more general claim based on the Due Process Clause. !d.,
at 105. Thus, the Court reaffirmed that the "case or controversy" aspect of standing is unsatisfied "where a taxpayer
seeks to employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his
generalized grievances about the conduct of government or
the allocation of power in the Federal System." I d., at 106.
Unlike the plaintiffs in Flast, respondents fail the first
prong of the test for taxpayer standing. Their claim is deficient in two respects. First, the source of their complaint is
not a congressional action, but a decision by HEW to transfer
a parcel of federal property. 15 Flast limited taxpayer standRespondents do not challenge the constitutionality of the Federal
Property and Administrative Services Act itself, but rather a particular
15
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ing to challenges directed "only [at] exercises of congressional power." Id., at 102. See Schlesinger v. Reservists
Committee to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 228 (1974) (denying standing because the taxpayer plaintiffs "did not challenge an enactment under Art. I, § 8, but rather the action of
the Executive Branch").
Second, and perhaps redundantly, the property transfer
about which respondents complain was not an exercise of authority conferred by the taxing and spending clause of Art. I,
§ 8. The authorizing legislation, the Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act of 1949, was an evident exercise
of Congress' power under the Property Clause, Art. IV, § 3,
cl. 2. 16 Respondents do not dispute this conclusion, see Brief
for Respondents 10, and it is decisive of any claim of taxpayer
standing under the Flast precedent. 17
Executive branch action arguably authorized by the Act.
16
The Act was designed "to simplify the procurement, utilization, and
disposal of Government property" in order to achieve an "efficient, businesslike system of property management." S. Rep. No. 475, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess., p. 1 (1949). See H. R. Rep. No. 670, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., pp.
1-2 (1949). Among the central purposes of the Act was the "maximum
utilization of property already owned by the Government and the minimum
purchasing of new property." S. Rep. No. 475, supra, at 4. Congress
recognized, however, that from time to time certain property would become surplus to the government, and in particular, property acquired by
the military to meet wartime contingencies. Congress provided a means
of disposing of this property to meet well-recognized public priorities, including education. See S. Rep. No. 475, supra, at 4-5; H.R. Rep. No.
670, supra, at 5-6.
17
Although not necessary to our decision, we note that any connection
between the challenged property transfer and respondents' tax burden is
at best speculative and at worst nonexistent. Although public funds were
expended to establish the Valley Forge General Hospital, the land was acquired and the facilities constructed thirty years prior to the challenged
transfer. Respondents do not challenge this expenditure, and we do not
immediately perceive how such a challenge might now be raised. Nor do
respondents dispute the government's conclusion that the property has become useless for federal purposes and ought to be disposed of in some pro-
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Any doubt that once might have existed concerning the
rigor with which the Flast exception to the Frothingham
principle ought to be applied should have been erased by this
Court's recent decisions in United States v. Richardson, 418
U. S. 166 (1974), and Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to
Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208 (1974). In Richardson, the
question was whether the plaintiff had standing as a federal
taxpayer to argue that legislation which permitted the Central Intelligence Agency to withhold from the public detailed
information about its expenditures violated the Accounts
Clause of the Constitution. 18 We rejected plaintiff's claim of
standing because "his challenge [was] not addressed to the
taxing or spending power, but to the statutes regulating the
CIA." 418 U. S., at 175. The "mere recital" of those claims
"demonstrate[d) how far he [fell] short of the standing criteria of Flast and how neatly he [fell] within the Frothingham
holding left undisturbed." I d., at 174-175.
The claim in Schlesinger was marred by the same deficiency. Plaintiffs in that case argued that the Incompatibilductive manner. In fact, respondents' only objection is that the government did not receive adequate consideration for the transfer, because
petitioner's use of the property will not confer a public benefit. See Brief
for Respondents 13. Assuming arguendo that this proposition is true, an
assumption by no means clear, there is no basis for believing that a transfer to a different purchaser would have added to government receipts. As
the government argues, "the ultimate purchaser would, in all likelihood,
have been another non-profit institution or local school district rather than
a purchaser for cash." Brief for United States 30. Moreover, each year
of delay in disposing of the property depleted the Treasury by the amounts
necessary to maintain a facility that had lost its value to the government.
Even if respondents had brought their claim within the outer limits of
Flast, therefore, they still would have encountered serious difficulty in
establishing that they "personally would benefit in a tangible way from the
court's intervention." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S., at 508.
8
' U. S. Canst., Art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ("[A]nd a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time").
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ity Clause of Art. I 19 prevented certain Members of Congress
from holding commissions in the Armed Forces Reserve.
We summarily rejected their assertion of standing as taxpayers because they "did not challenge an enactment under Art.
I, § 8, but rather the action of the Executive Branch in permitting Members of Congress to maintain their Reserve status." 418 U. S., at 228.
Respondents, therefore, are plainly without standing to
sue as taxpayers. The Court of Appeals apparently reached
the same conclusion. It remains to be seen whether respondents have alleged any other basis for standing to bring
this suit.
IV
Although the Court of Appeals properly doubted respondents' ability to establish standing solely on the basis of their
taxpayer status, it considered their allegations of taxpayer
injury to be "essentially an assumed role." 619 F. 2d, at 261.
"Plaintiffs have no reason to expect, nor perhaps do they
care about, any personal tax saving that might result
should they prevail. The crux of the interest at stake,
the plaintiffs argue, is found in the Establishment
Clause, not in the supposed loss of money as such. As a
matter of primary identity, therefore, the plaintiffs are
not so much taxpayers as separationists .... " Ibid. ·
In the court's view, respondents had established standing by
virtue of an "'injury in fact' to their shared individuated right
to a government that 'shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion.'" Ibid. The court distinguished this
"injury" from "the question of 'citizen standing' as such."
I d., at 262. Although citizens generally could not establish
standing simply by claiming an interest in governmental ob19
U. S. Const., Art. I, § 6, cl. 2 ("[N]o Person holding any Office under
the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office").
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servance of the Constitution, respondents had "set forth instead a particular and concrete injury" to a "personal constitutional right." I d., at 265.
The Court of Appeals was surely correct in recognizing
that the Art. III requirements of standing are not satisfied
by "the abstract injury in nonobservance of the Constitution
asserted by . . . citizens." Schlesinger v. Reservists
Commmittee to Stop the War, 418 U. S., at 223, n. 3. This
Court repeatedly has rejected claims of standing predicated
on "'the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the
Government be administered according to law .... ' Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U. S. 126, 129 [1922]." Baker v. Carr,
369 U. S. 186, 208 (1962). See Schlesinger v. Reservists
Commmittee to Stop the War, supra, at 216-222; Laird v. Tatum, 408 U. S. 1 (1972); Ex parte Levitt, 302 U. S. 633 (1937).
Such claims amount to little more than attempts "to employ a
federal court as a forum in which to air ... generalized grievances ·about the conduct of government." Flast v. Cohen,
392 U. S., at 106.
In finding that respondents had alleged something more
than "the generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional
governance," Schlesinger, supra, at 217, the Court of Appeals relied on factual differences which we do not think
amount to legal distinctions. The court decided that respondents' claim differed from those in Schlesinger and Richardson, which were predicated, respectively, on the Incompatibility and Accounts Clauses, because "it is at the very least
arguable that the Establishment Clause creates in each citizen a 'personal constitutional right' to a government that
does not establish religion." 619 F. 2d, at 265 (footnote
omitted). The court found it unnecessary to determine
whether this "arguable" proposition was correct, since it
judged the mere allegation of a legal right sufficient to confer
standing.
This reasoning process merely disguises, we think with a
rather thin veil, the inconsistency of the court's results with
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our decisions in Schlesinger and Richardson. The plaintiffs
in those cases plainly asserted a "personal right" to have the
government act in accordance with their views of the Constitution; indeed, we see no barrier to the assertion of such
claims with respect to any constitutional provision. But assertion of a right to a particular kind of government conduct,
which the government has violated by acting differently, cannot alone satisfy the requirements of Art. III without draining those requirements of meaning.
Nor can Schlesinger and Richardson be distinguished on
the ground that the Incompatibility and Accounts Clauses are
in some way less "fundamental" than the Establishment
Clause. Each establishes a norm of conduct which the federal government is bound to honor-to no greater or lesser
extent than any other inscribed in the Constitution. To the
extent the Court of Appeals relied on a view of standing under which the Art. III burdens diminish as the "importance"
of the claim on the merits increases, we reject that notion.
The requirement of standing "focuses on the party seeking to
get his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues
he wishes to have adjudicated." Flast v. Cohen, supra, at
99. Moreover, we know of no principled basis on which to
create a hierarchy of constitutional values or a complementary "sliding scale" of standing which might permit respondents to invoke the judicial power of the United States. 20
20
The dissent is premised on a revisionist reading of our precedents
which leads to the conclusion that the Art. III requirement of standing is
satisfied by any taxpayer who contends "that the federal government has
exceeded the bounds of the law in allocating its largesse," post, at - - .
"The concept of taxpayer injury necessarily recognizes the continuing
stake of the taxpayer in the disposition of the Treasury to which he has
contributed his taxes, and his right to have those funds put to lawful uses."
I d. , a t - . On this novel understanding, the dissents reads cases such as
Frothingham and Flast as decisions on the merits of the taxpayers' claims.
Frothingham is explained as a holding that a taxpayer ordinarily has no
legal right to challenge congressional expenditures. I d., at - - . The

"'
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"The proposition that all constitutional provisions are enforceable by any citizen simply because citizens are the ultimate beneficiaries of those provisions has no boundaries."
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, supra,
at 227.
The complaint in this case shares a common deficiency with
those in Schlesinger and Richardson. Although they claim
dissent divines from Flast the holding that a taxpayer does have an enforceable right "to challenge a federal bestowal of largesse" for religious
purposes. I d., at - - . This right extends to "the Government as a
whole, regardless of which branch is at work in a particular instance," id.,
at--, and regardless of whether the challenged action was an exercise of
the spending power, id., a t - - - However appealing this reconstruction of precedent may be, it bears little resemblance to the cases on which it purports to rest. Frothingham
and Flast were decisions that plainly turned on standing, and just as
plainly they rejected any notion that the Art. III requirement of direct injury is satisfied by a taxpayer who contends "that .the federal government
has exceeded the bounds of the law in allocating its largesse." I d., at
- - . Moreover, although the dissent's view may lead to a result satisfying to many in this case, it is not evident how its substitution of "legal interest," id., at--, for "standing" enhances "our understanding of the
meaning of rights under law," id., at - - . Logically, the dissent must
shoulder the burden of explaining why taxpayers with standing have no
"legal interest" in congressional expenditures except when it is possible to
allege a violation of the Establishment Clause: yet it does not attempt to do
so.
Nor does the dissent's interpretation of standing adequately explain
cases such as Schlesinger and Richardson. According to the dissent, the
taxpayer plaintiffs in those cases lacked standing, not because they failed
to challenge an exercise of the spending power, but because they did not
complain of "the distribution of government largesse." I d., at - - . And
yet if the standing of a taxpayer is established by his "continuing stake . . .
in the disposition of the Treasury to which he has contributed his taxes,"
id., at - - , it would seem to follow that he can assert a right to examine
the budget of the CIA, as in Richardson, see 418 U. 8., at 211, and a right
to argue that members of Congress cannot claim reserve pay from the government, as in Schlesinger, see 418 U. 8. , at 211. Of course, both claims
have been rejected, precisely because Art. III requires a demonstration of
redressable injury that is not satisfied by a claim that tax monies have been
spent unlawfully.
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that the Constitution has been violated, they claim nothing
else. They fail to identify any personal injury suffered by
the plaintiffs as a consequence of the alleged constitutional
error, other than the psychological consequence presumably
produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees. That is not an injury sufficient to confer standing
under Art. III, even though the disagreement is phrased in
constitutional terms. It is evident that respondents are
firmly committed to the constitutional principle of separation
of church and State, but standing is not measured by the intensity of the litigant's interest or the fervor of his advocacy.
"[T]hat concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues," Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S., at 204, is the anticipated consequence of proceedings commenced by one who
has been injured in fact; it is not a permissible substitute for
the showing of injury itself. 21
In reaching this conclusion, we do not retreat from our earlier holdings-that standing may be predicated on noneconomic
mJury. See, e. g., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S., at
686-688; Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U. S., at
153-154. We simply cannot see that respondents have alleged an injury of any kind, economic or otherwise, sufficient
to confer standing. 22 Respondents complain of a transfer of
21
In Schlesinger, we rejected the argument that standing should be recognized because "the adverse parties sharply conflicted in their interests
and views and were supported by able briefs and arguments." 418 U. S.,
at 225:
"We have no doubt about the sincerity of respondents' stated objectives
and the depth of their commitment to them. But the essence of standing
'is not a question of motivation but of possession of the requisite . . . interest that is, or is threatened to be, injured by the unconstitutional conduct.'
Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429, 435 (1952).'' !d., at
225-226.
22
Respondents rely on our statement in Data Processing Serv. v. Camp,
397 U. S. 150, 154 (1970), that "[a] person or family may have a spiritual
stake in First Amendment values sufficient to give standing to raise issues
concerning the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 [1963]." Respondents
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property located in Chester County, Pennsylvania. The
named plaintiffs reside in Maryland and Virginia; 23 their organizational headquarters are located in Washington, D.C.
They learned of the transfer through a news release. Their
claim that the government has violated the Establishment
Clause does not provide a special license to roam the country
in search of governmental wrongdoing and to reveal their disapparently construe this language to mean that any person asserting an
Establishment Clause violation possesses a "spiritual stake" sufficient to
confer standing. The language will not bear that weight. First, the language cannot be read apart from the context of its accompanying reference
to Abington School District v. Schempp, supra. In Schempp, the Court
invalidated laws that required Bible reading in the public schools. Plaintiffs were children who attended the schools in question, and their parents.
The Court noted:
"It goes without saying that the laws and practices involved here can be
challenged only by persons having standing to complain . .. .The parties
here are school children and their parents, who are directly affected by the
laws and practices against which their complaints are directed. These interests surely suffice to give the parties standing to complain." I d., at
224, n. 9.
The Court also drew a comparison with Doremus v. Board of Education,
342 U. S. 429 (1952), in which the identical substantive issues were raised,
but in which the appeal was "dismissed upon the graduation of the school
child involved and because of the appellants' failure to establish standing as
taxpayers." 374 U. S., at 224, n. 9. The Court's discussion of the standing issue is not extensive, but it is sufficient to show the error in respondents' broad reading of the phrase "spiritual stake." The plaintiffs in
Schemmp had standing, not because their complaint rested on the Establishment Clause-for as Doremus demonstrated, that is insufficient-but
because impressionable schoolchildren were subjected to unwelcome religious exercises or were forced to assume special burdens to avoid them.
Respondents have alleged no comparable injury.
23
Respondent Americans United claims that it has certain unidentified
members who reside in Pennsylvania. It does not explain, however, how
this fact establishes a cognizable injury where none existed before. Respondent is still obligated to allege facts sufficient to establish that one or
more of its members has suffered, or is threatened with, an injury other
than their belief that the transfer violated the Constitution.
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coveries in federal court. 24 The federal courts were simply
not constituted as ombudsmen of the general welfare.

v
The Court of Appeals in this case ignored unambiguous
limitations on taxpayer and citizen standing. It appears to
have done so out of the conviction that enforcement of the
Establishment Clause demands special exceptions from the
requirement that a plaintiff allege "'distinct and palpable injury to himself,' ... that is likely to be redressed if the requested relief is granted." Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of
Bellwood, 441 U. S., at 100 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422
U. S., at 501). The court derived precedential comfort from
Flast v. Cohen, supra: "The underlying justification for according standing in Flast it seems, was the implicit recognition that the Establishment Clause does create in every citizen a personal constitutional right, such that any citizen,
including taxpayers, may contest under that clause the constitutionality of federal expenditures." 619 F. 2d, at 262. 25
24

Respondents also claim standing by reference to the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 702 (1976), which authorizes judicial review at
the instance of any person who has been "adversely affected or aggrieved
by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute." Neither the
Administrative Procedure Act, nor any other congressional enactment, can
lower the threshold requirements of standing under Art. Ill. See, e. g.,
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S., at 100; Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U. S., at 501. Respondents do not allege that the Act creates
a legal right, "the invasion of which creates standing," Linda R .S . v. Richard D., 410 U. S., at 617, n. 3., and there is no other basis for arguing that
its existence alters the rules of standing otherwise applicable to this case.
25
The majority believed that the only thing which prevented this Court
from openly acknowledging this position was the fact that the complaint in
Flast had alleged no basis for standing other than the plaintiffs' taxpayer
status. 619 F. 2d, at 262. As the dissent below pointed out, this view is
simply not in accord with the facts. See id., at 269--270. The Flast plaintiffs and several amici strongly urged the Court to adopt the same view of
standing for which respondents argue in this case. The Court plainly
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The concurring opinion was even more direct. In its view,
"statutes alleged to violate the Establishment Clause may
not have an individual impact sufficient to confer standing in
the traditional sense." I d., at 268. To satisfy "the ne~d for
an available plaintiff," id., at 267, and thereby to assure a basis for judicial review, respondents should be granted standing because, "as a practical matter, no one is better suited to
bring this lawsuit and thus vindicate the freedoms embodied
in the Establishment Clause," id., at 266.
Implicit in the foregoing is the philosophy that the business
of the federal courts is correcting constitutional errors, and
that "cases and controversies" are at best merely convenient
vehicles for doing so and at worst nuisances that may be dispensed with when they become obstacles to that transcendent endeavor. This philosophy has no place in our constitutional scheme. It does not become more palatable when the
underlying merits concern the Establishment Clause. Respondents' claim of standing implicitly rests on the presumption that violations of the Establishment Clause typically will
not cause injury sufficient to confer standing under the "traditional" view of Art. III. But "[t]he assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a reason to find standing." Schlesinger v.
Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U. S., at 227.
This view would convert standing into a requirement that
must be observed only when satisfied. Moreover, we are
unwilling to assume that injured parties are nonexistent simply because they have not joined respondents in their suit.
The law of averages is not a substitute for standing.
Were we to accept respondents' claim of standing in this
case, there would be no principled basis for confining our exchose not to do so. Even if respondents were correct in arguing that the
Court in Flast was bound by a "perceived limitation in the pleadings," id. ,
at 262, we are not so bound in this case, and we find no merit in respondents' vision of standing.
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ception to litigants relying on the Establishment Clause.
Ultimately, that exception derives from the idea that the judicial power requires nothing more for its invocation than important issues and able litigants. 26 The existence of injured
parties who might not wish to bring suit becomes irrelevant.
Because we are unwilling to countenance such a departure
from the limits on judicial power contained in Art. III, the
judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

It is so ordered.

26

Were we to recognize standing premised on an "injury" consisting
solely of an alleged violation of a "'personal constitutional right' to a government that does not establish religion," 619 F. 2d, at 265, a principled
consistency would dictate recognition of respondents' standing to challenge
execution of every capital sentence on the basis of a personal right to a government that does not impose cruel and unusual punishment, or standing to
challenge every affirmative action program on the basis of a personal right
to a government that does not deny equal protection of the laws, to choose
but two among as many possible examples as there are commands in the
Constitution.
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